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INTRODUCTION

A cornerstone of American jurisprudence is the principle that federal
courts have limited jurisdiction.) Federal courts may hear only cases or controversies that meet the requirements of both the United States Constitution,
article III and a jurisdictional grant by Congress.2 Conversely, state courts

1. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)(well-established principle that federal

courts have limited jurisdiction). See generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3522 (2d ed. 1984)(overview of concept that federal
courts have limited jurisdiction).
2. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978)(limits imposed on federal courts by Constitution or Congress must not be disregarded); Sheldon v. Sill,
49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 442 (1849)(Congress may restrict jurisdiction of lower federal courts);
Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809)(constitutionally created jurisdiction
of lower federal courts cannot be enlarged by Congress). See generally 1 J. MOORE, J. LuCAS,
H. FINK, D. WECKSTEIN & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE.
.60[3] (2d ed.
1986)(federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction).
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are courts of general jurisdiction unless controverting facts show otherwise.3
The situation is reversed in federal court where the claimant must rebut a
presumption against jurisdiction.4 Thus, in federal court, the threshold issue
of jurisdiction becomes a matter of overwhelming importance. 5
Federal law grants a defendant the right, in certain situations, to remove a
case from state court to federal court.6 However, the defendant must show
that the federal court has jurisdiction over the complaint.7 Federal subject
matter jurisdiction may be based on either diversity of citizenship' or the
presence of a federal question. 9 For more than one hundred years, federal

3. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)(state trial courts are courts of general
jurisdiction); see also C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 7 at 22-23 (4th ed. 1983)(most
state courts are courts of general jurisdiction).
4. See, e.g., Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 337 (1895)(presumption
that federal court without jurisdiction); King Iron Bridge & Mfg. Co. v. County of Oteo, 120
U.S. 225, 226 (1887)(presumption that federal court lacks jurisdiction); Bors v. Preston, 111
U.S. 252, 255 (1884)(federal court jurisdiction must appear affirmatively in record due to presumption against jurisdiction). See generally Baker, Thinking About FederalJurisdiction- Of
Serpents and Swallows, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 239, 239-41 (1986)(details importance of rebutting
presumption against jurisdiction).
5. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(aXl)(requires pleading to set forth ground of court's jurisdiction); see also McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)(party
seeking relief in federal court must state facts in pleading demonstrating court's jurisdiction).
Questions of jurisdiction are not mere disputes over procedural technicalities, but, instead,
they are fundamental problems of constitutional law. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 1 at 1 (4th ed. 1983). Perhaps Justice Frankfurter put it best when he wrote: "The law of
the jurisdiction of this Court raises problems of a highly technical nature. But underlying their
solution are matters of substance in the practical working of our dual system .... " Flournoy
v. Weiner, 321 U.S. 253, 263 (1944).
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982)(federal removal statute).
7. See Grubbs v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 702 (1972)(question in removal case whether federal district court would have had original jurisdiction). Removal is
purely statutory and dependent on the whim of Congress. There was no comparable procedure at English common law, but the United States has provided for removal jurisdiction since
the Judiciary Act of 1789. See 14A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3721 (2d ed. 1984). Removal to federal courts is complicated and
technical, requiring both procedural and jurisdictional considerations. For a discussion of the
procedural aspects of removal, see generally Fritsche and Osman, In and Out of FederalCourt:
Removal and Remand, 51 TEX. B.J. 85, 85-87 (1988).
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982). Questions about diversity jurisdiction are not within the
scope of this comment. For a discussion of diversity, see generally Rowe and Sibley, Beyond
Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7, 7-14
(1986)(overview of modern implications of federal diversity jurisdiction).
9. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). The United States Constitution contains the original
grant of federal question jurisdiction. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Even though federal
question jurisdiction was one of the primary reasons the Constitution granted Congress the
power to create inferior federal courts, Congress did not give federal courts original jurisdiction over these cases until 1875. See 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3561 (2d ed. 1984).
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courts have required that a federal question appear on the face of the plaintiff's complaint in order to invoke jurisdiction in federal question cases.1 °
This requirement is known as the well-pleaded complaint rule." The wellpleaded complaint rule also applies to a defendant's right to removal.12
The well-pleaded complaint rule has been used in attempts to defeat congressional intent to regulate different areas of the law."' From the 1930's
onward, Congress displaced state law in numerous fields through use of its
commerce clause power.' 4 Because federal remedies for violations of federal
law are often not as favorable as state law causes of action,"5 plaintiffs have

10. See, e.g., Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936)(controversy must be
disclosed on face of complaint); Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914)(federal jurisdiction due to federal question must appear in plaintiff's claim); Gold-Washing & Water Co. v.
Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 203 (1877)(first case construing 1875 statute required federal juestion to
appear on face of complaint).
11. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463i U.S. 1, 9
(1983)(powerful doctrine controlling federal question jurisdiction known as "i ell-pleaded
complaint" rule). See generally 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3566 (2d ed. 1984)(presents overview of well-pleaded complaint

rule).
12. See Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 461 (1894)(first case explicitly linking well-pleaded complaint rule to removal jurisdiction).
13. See, e.g., Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n.2 (198 1)(federal
law claims artfully pled as state law claims in order to avoid federal jurisdiction); Hearst Corp.
v. Shopping Center Network, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 551, 556 (1969)(plaintiff's use of well-pleaded
complaint rule to defeat congressional intent unacceptable).
14. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)(National Labor Relations Act of 1937 regulated labor); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)(Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964
regulates employer-employee relations); 29 U.S.C. §§ 553, 671-678 (1982)(Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970 regulates working conditions across nation); 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309,
441, 1001-1461 (1982)(Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 regulates nation's
private pension plans). This is a list of federal laws which regulate employer-employee relationships. In addition, the federal government regulates numerous other fields of endeavor. In
the 1930's and 1940's the United States Supreme Court construed the commerce clause as
giving congress the power to regulate the national economy through various pieces of "New
Deal" legislation. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942)(Congress exercised
constitutionally appropriate power under commerce clause to regulate prices for commodities); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-9 (1941)(federal hour and wage regulation
upheld for employees engaged in goods production for interstate commerce); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937)(old age benefits provision of Social Security Act upheld). See
generally NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4.9 (3d ed. 1986)(traces
extension of federal regulation through commerce clause power).
15. See Powers v. Southern Cent. United Food & Commercial Workers Unions, 719 F.2d
760, 761 (5th Cir. 1983). In Powers, the plaintiff brought suit against her employer's pension
plan under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices - Consumer Protection Act (DTPA) despite
the fact that she also had a cause of action under the federal Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Id. at 761-62. It is not difficult to understand why the plaintiff
chose to forsake the federal law in favor of the state remedy. The DTPA provides for the
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frequently failed to plead federal claims to avoid removal to federal court.'

6

In one narrow field of law, the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947
(LMRA) 301,7 removal has been allowed without reference to the plaintiff's complaint. 8 This doctrine is known as preemption removal.' 9 Recently, the United States Supreme Court expanded preemption removal to
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).2 ° By so
doing, the Court defined the requirements of preemption removal and laid

the foundation for further expansion of federal court jurisdiction.2 1

This comment will examine the evolution of the preemption removal doctrine. Initially, federal question jurisdiction and competing interpretations
of the well-pleaded complaint rule will be explained. Next, the doctrine of
preemption removal will be traced from its beginnings through the passage
of ERISA. Detailed analysis will be given to the Court's extension of preemption removal to certain ERISA actions. Finally, this comment will assert that preemption removal should be applied to other federal laws which
meet the Court's qualifications.
II.
A.

FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION AND PREEMPTION REMOVAL

The Meaning of "Arising Under"

The United States Constitution grants jurisdiction to federal courts over
"Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their au-

recovery of treble damages. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon 1988).
Punitive damages are not provided for in ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(1)(B)(1982).
16. E.g., Trent Realty Assocs. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 657 F.2d 29, 32 (3d Cir.
198 l)(plaintiff initiated state complaint despite availability of federal law); First Nat'l Bank of
Aberdeen v. Aberdeen Nat'l Bank, 627 F.2d 843, 845-6 (8th Cir. 1980)(plaintiff relied on state
law instead of pleading federal law).
17. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
18. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, - U.S. _, _ 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1546, 95 L.
Ed. 2d 55, 63 (1987)(LMRA § 301 claims completely preempt area of law); see also Avco
Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968)(claims arising under LMRA § 301
clearly federal).
19. See Price v. PSA, Inc., 829 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1987)(refers to doctrine as "preemption removal"); see also Comment, Federal Preemption, Removal Jurisdiction, and the
WellPleaded Complaint Rule, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 634, 648 (1984)(refers to Avco situation as
preemption removal). The doctrine is also referred to as "extraordinary preemption" and
"complete preemption." See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, _ U.S. , - 107 S. Ct.
1542, 1547, 95 L. Ed. 2d 55, 64 (1987).
20. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, - U.S.
107 S.Ct. 1542, 1547, 95 L.
Ed. 2d 55, 64 (1987).
21. See Texas Employers Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 820 F.2d 1406, 1420 (5th Cir. 1987)(preemption removal extended to Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act claims).
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thority." z This clause was first construed by Chief Justice Marshall in Osborne v. Bank of the United States. 3 In Osborne, the Bank of the United
States, which had been chartered by Congress to sue and be sued, brought
suit to enjoin the Ohio state auditor from collecting an allegedly unconstitutional tax from the bank.2 4 Chief Justice Marshall held that federal jurisdiction existed in any suit concerning the Bank of the United States.25 The
bank was a mere creature of federal law, therefore, any case to which the
bank was a party arose under the United States Constitution because federal
law was an "ingredient" of the claim.2 6 Marshall's "ingredient" theory of
arising under did not become important until general jurisdiction was
granted to federal courts by Congress in 1875.27 The expansive reading
given "arising under" in Osborne might have opened the federal courts to a
flood of litigation, 28 therefore, the statutory grant was more narrowly construed by federal judges in the late nineteenth century.29
B.

The Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule

One of the theories which federal courts developed to restrict the statutory
grant of jurisdiction was the "well-pleaded complaint" rule.3" Under this
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
23. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
24. Id. at 828-29.
25. Id. at 827-28.
26. Id. at 823.
27. See Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1982)). Prior to Judiciary Act of 1875, Congress limited federal appellate review to
federal issues decided by state courts. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1987)).
28. See Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137 § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1982)). The Judiciary Act of 1875 repeated verbatim the language of article III, section 2 of the Constitution. See id. Osborne set the outer constitutional limits of arising under
jurisdiction, while Congress granted less jurisdiction than the Constitution authorized. See
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 494 (1983). Fear of opening the
federal courthouse door to a flood of litigation prompted a more restrictive reading. See Pacific R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 24-5 (1885)(Waite, J., dissenting)(broad meaning of
"arising under" would lead to federal court jurisdiction over all cases involving federal corporations). See generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3562, at 22-3 (2d ed. 1984)(under ingredient test every land title case in western
states could be brought in federal court).
29. See, e.g., Verlinden B. V., 461 U.S. at 494 (Art. III jurisdiction broader than federal
question jurisdiction in § 1331); Starin v. City of New York, 115 U.S. 248, 257 (1885)(if construction of Constitution or law of United States defeats or sustains recovery, then federal
question present); Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keys, 96 U.S. 199, 203-4 (1877)(suit must
arise out of controversy about effect of Constitution or laws). See generally C. WRIGHT, THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 93 (4th ed. 1983)(1875 statute given more restrictive reading while
purporting to follow Osborne rule).
30. See Gold- Washing & Water Co., 96 U.S. at 203 (federal court jurisdiction must appear
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rule, federal jurisdiction will not attach unless a federal question appears on
the face of the complaint, unaided by the anticipation of a federal defense. 3
The well-pleaded complaint rule also applies to federal removal jurisdiction.32 A case filed in state court cannot be removed unless the federal district court could have had original jurisdiction.3 3 Therefore, the defendant's
right to a federal forum is conditioned upon whether the plaintiff chooses to
invoke a federal claim in its complaint. 34 The linking of removal jurisdiction
to the well-pleaded complaint rule has been routinely criticized by commentators as an incentive to forum manipulation, or artful pleading, on the part
rely on state law when federal
of the plaintiff.3 5 The plaintiff can claim to
36
law should actually govern the complaint.

on record as required by good pleading). Since Gold- Washing & Water Co., the well-pleaded
complaint rule has been consistently reasserted. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983)(well-pleaded complaint rule powerful doctrine
which severely limits number of cases tried in federal district court); Verlinden B. V., 461 U.S.
at 494 (question in case arose solely as defense not on face of well-pleaded complaint).
31. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). In Mottley, the
Louisville & Nashville railroad agreed to give the Mottley's free passes each year for the rest of
their lives as settlement for a tort claim. See id. at 150. In 1906, the Hepburn Act prohibited
railroads from granting free passes; subsequently the railroad refused to renew the Mottley's
passes. See id. at 151. The Mottley's brought suit in federal district court alleging the breach
of contract was based solely on the Hepburn Act. Id. The Supreme Court held that the Mottley's were barred from pursuing their case in federal court because the federal question did
not appear on the face of their well-pleaded complaint, but was merely an anticipated defense

to their claim. See id. at 152.
32. See Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1894). The Supreme
Court first engrafted the well-pleaded complaint rule onto the removal statute while construing
the Act of March 3, 1887, amending the Judiciary Act of 1875. See id. at 458-9. The Court
stated that the well-pleaded complaint rule applied to the removal statute, and the defendant
could remove his case only if the plaintiff could have originally brought an action in federal
court. See id. at 461-2. Prior to Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, the well-pleaded complaint rule was not applied to the removal statute. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10-11 n. 9 (1983).
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)(1982). Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of
Congress, any civil action brought in a state court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such
action is pending. Id.
34. See Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 461-2 (1894)(defendant may
remove if upon face of plaintiff's complaint federal court has jurisdiction).
35. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 196-200 (1969)(proposed change of removal statute to

allow removal based on federal defense or counterclaims) Currie, The Federal Courts and the
American Law Institute (pt.2), 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 269 (1969)(well-pleaded complaint
rule capricious and unrelated to jurisdictional policy); Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise "Directly" Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 915
(1967)(well-pleaded complaint rule sets arbitrary and capricious standard).
36. See Nuclear Eng'g Co. v. Scott, 660 F.2d 241, 249 (7th Cir. 1981)(plaintiff may not
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Generally, there are two interpretations of the well-pleaded complaint
rule.37 The first approach emphasizes the "plaintiff's statement," and is explained in Gully v. FirstNational Bank.a" In Gully, Justice Cardozo, stated
that a federal question ". . must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint

unaided by the answer or the petition for removal... ."'I Under Gully, the
characterization of the plaintiff's complaint as stating federal or purely state
law claims becomes dispositive of the cause of action."
In the second approach, a court may look beyond the surface of the plaintiff's complaint to ascertain the true nature of the cause of action. This interpretation of the well-pleaded complaint rule can be found in Skelly Oil
Company v. Phillips Petroleum Company.4 In Skelly Oil, the declaratory
judgment plaintiff alleged a federal right, however, the Supreme Court held
that the federal right alleged was only in anticipation of a federal defense to a
state law contract claim.4 2 The Court hypothesized that if the declaratory
judgment plaintiff had brought a coercive action4" against the defendant
there would have been no federal question in the plaintiff's complaint.'
Under Skelly Oil, the Court must look beneath the face of the declaratory
deny federal jurisdiction by artfully disguising federal claim). See generally Twitchell, Characterizing Federal Claims: Preemption, Removal, and the Arising-UnderJurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 825-834 (1986)(fear of forum manipulation provides
strong impetus to recharacterize plaintiff's state claim as federal).
37. See Comment, FederalPreemption, Removal Jurisdiction, and the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 634, 646 (1984)(discusses dual interpretation of well-pleaded
complaint rule).
38. 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
39. Id. at 112-13.
40. See, e.g., Local Div. No. 714, Etc. v. Greater Portland, Etc., 589 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.
1978)(essential inquiry whether face of complaint alleges cause of action based on federal law);
North Davis Bank v. First Nat'l Bank of Layton, 457 F.2d 820, 823 (10th Cir. 1972)(state
court case removable only when federal question appears on face of complaint); Rivera v.
Federacion de Musicos de Puerto Rico, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1169, 1171-72 (D.P.R. 1974)(federal
question arises only when element of plaintiff's complaint). Justice Cardozo stated that it was
futile to attempt to ascertain the true character of a plaintiff's cause of action. See Gully, 299
U.S. at 117.
41. 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
42. See Skelly, 339 U.S. at 672-74. Phillips brought suit under the Declaratory Judgment
Act for a declaration that contracts between the plaintiff and defendant were still in effect. See
id. at 669-71. The contracts were contingent upon a third party, Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline
Co., receiving a federal license to construct pipelines to carry natural gas interstate. See id. at
669. The declaratory judgment petition specifically asked whether the Michigan-Wisconsin
pipelines had been federally certified. See id. at 670. The Court wrote that Phillips was trying
to get into federal court through the back door by anticipating a defense based on federal law.
See id. at 673-74.
43. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 19
(1983)(coercive action is action seeking any relief other than declaratory judgment).
44. See Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 672 (if Skelly sought damages or specific performance, suit
would arise under state contract law).
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judgment complaint to determine whether the actual dispute is based on federal law.4 5
The Gully approach to the well-pleaded complaint rule significantly restricts the number of preemption cases that reach federal court.46 Federal
preemption is usually a defense to a plaintiff's state law claim.4 7 Therefore,
if the Gully approach is followed, state courts will usually make the crucial
decision whether state law or federal law is to apply.4" Some commentators
believe there is a danger that state courts may thwart the intent of Con-

gress.4 9 On the other hand, in the past, courts have expressed a fear that
extending the Skelly Oil approach beyond the confines of the Declaratory
Judgment Act would vitiate the well-pleaded complaint rule.5" It is neces-

45. See id. at 672-74. The Court, in Skelly Oil, feared that declaratory judgment action
would open the federal courthouse door to a flood of litigation and encourage a race to the
courthouse. See id. at 673. The Court held that the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act was
procedural. See id. at 671. Therefore, courts must look at the underlying lawsuit and can only
exercise jurisdiction if it would be proper in the absence of the Declaratory Judgment Act. Id.
See generally Note, FederalJurisdiction over Preemption Claims: A Post-FranchiseTax Board
Analysis, 62 TEx. L. REV. 893, 899-900 (1984)(overview of the decision in Skelly Oil).
46. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 129 (1974)(federal
court lacked jurisdiction because only effect of Natural Gas Act was to overcome potential
defense to action); Superior Oil Co. v. Pioneer Corp., 706 F.2d 603, 606 (5th Cir. 1983)(federal
court lacked jurisdiction because Natural Gas Policy Act would be brought into action only as
defense to state suit); Howard v. Furst, 238 F.2d 790, 793 (2d Cir. 1956)(case did not arise
under federal laws because Section 14(a) of Securities Exchange Act did not create federal
right).
47. See, e.g., Olgiun v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 704 F.2d 1468, 1470 (9th Cir.
1984)(plaintiff's carefully worded complaint invoked state law, but defendant removed on federal preemption basis); Rose v. Intelogic Trace, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 1328, 1329 (W.D. Tex.
1987)(plaintiff brought suit in state court alleging wrongful termination; defendant successfully
removed to federal court on ERISA preemption); Kerbow v. Kerbow, 421 F. Supp. 1253,
1256-57 (N.D. Tex. 1976)(plaintiff filed case in state court seeking portion of ex-husband's
pension; defendant unsuccessful in attempt to remove on ERISA preemption basis).
48. See Eure v. NVF Co., 481 F. Supp. 639, 643 (E.D. N.C. 1979)(state judges capable of
adjucating federal rights in preemption dispute). See generally Twitchell, CharacterizingFederal Claims: Preemption, Removal, and the Arising-Under Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts,
54 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 812, 859 (1986)(modification of Gully approach to well-pleaded complaint rule would result in federal courts making more preemption decisions).
49. See Twitchell, CharacterizingFederalClaims: Preemption, Removal, and the ArisingUnder Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 812, 814 n. 8 (1986)(state
courts may distort federal policy if allowed to make initial decision); see also Segreti, Vesting
the Whole "Arising Under" Power of the DistrictCourts in FederalPreemption Cases, 37 OKLA.
L. REv. 539, 557-58 (1984)(federal courts more likely than state courts to find federal
preemption).
50. Eg., Pan American Petro. Corp. v. Superior Court of Del., 366 U.S. 656, 663
(1961)(no substitute for well-pleaded complaint rule that defendant certain to raise federal
defense); Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1984)(court recognizes
defendant's interest in having federal preemption decided in federal court but current removal
statute won't allow), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 863 (1986); Powers v. South Cent. United Food &
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sary to recall that the Court in Skelly Oil modified Gully to achieve the goal
of the well-pleaded complaint rule, which is to keep cases that primarily
involve state law issues out of federal courts.5 Federal courts are faced with
a dilemma when presented a removal petition based on federal preemption.
Are federal courts limited to a mechanical inspection of the state court plaintiff's petition," or may they inquire into the underlying nature of the plaintiff's cause
of action?53 This dilemma implicates the nature of our federal
system: 4 Will federal or state courts decide preemption questions? 5
C.

The Development of Preemption Removal
In the second half of the twentieth century, the well-pleaded complaint

Commercial Workers Unions, 719 F.2d 760, 765 (5th Cir. 1983)(plaintiff relied on no federal
cause of action; therefore, removal not allowed on basis of ERISA preemption).
51. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-72 (1950)(Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act enlarged range of remedies but did not extend federal court jurisdiction). Justice Frankfurter, author of the Skelly Oil opinion, looked beyond the plaintiff's
declaratory relief complaint to the underlying cause of action in order to restrain federal court
jurisdiction. See Comment, Federal Preemption, Removal Jurisdiction,and the Well-Pleaded
Complaint Rule, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 634, 644 n. 40 (1984). Justice Frankfurter believed the
Supreme Court and the federal court system had a defined sphere within which to operate; due
to this philosophy, he did not support expanding federal court jurisdiction. See H. THOMAS,
FELIX FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH 268-71 (1960).
52. See, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, - U.S. -. -, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 2430, 96 L. Ed.

2d 318, 326 (1987)(case may not be removed to federal court on basis of federal preemption,
even if both parties concede only federal question in dispute); Pan American Petro. Corp. v.
Superior Court of Del., 366 U.S. 656, 663 (196 1)(no federal question jurisdiction even if certain
defendant will raise federal defense); Motores, S.A. v. Eagle Nat'l Bank, 632 F. Supp. 645, 647
(S.D. Fla. 1986)(court can look to plaintiff's complaint and no other pleading to determine if
federal question present).
53. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, _

U.S.

,

,

107 S. Ct. 1542, 1548,

95 L. Ed. 2d 55, 65 (1987)(under the facts of Taylor, suits which purport raising only state law
claims are necessarily federal and removable by defendant); Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No.
735, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968)(plaintiff's state law claim removed to federal court because suit
clearly arose under federal law); Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, 98 F. Supp. 278, 280
(S.D.N.Y. 1951)(court may look beyond plaintiff's complaint to ascertain status of parties in
removal proceeding).
54. See Mishkin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw" Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of Nationaland State Rules for Decisions, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 797 (1957). Professor Mishkin states:
As the national government expands into widening realms of activities, its operations
ramify myriads of new and existing legal relationships ....

The question of what law,

state or federal, and in what combinations, should govern the several parts of these different relationships thus becomes more frequent and pressing.
Id.
55. See Twitchell, CharacterizingFederalClaims: Preemption, Removal, and the ArisingUnderJurisdictionof the FederalCourts, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 812, 814 (1986)(should state
or federal system get first crack at deciding preemption questions).
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rule clashed with burgeoning federal regulation.5 6 Federal preemption removal questions began appearing frequently in the courts." Competing
readings of the well-pleaded complaint rule, and a growing public policy in
favor of federal regulation, combined to create confusion over preemption
removal. Removal based on preemption was first recognized in the field of
labor law.58 However, the limits of preemption removal remained unclear.
In 1947, Congress passed the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA),
which was designed to protect employers, employees, and the general public
Section 301 of the LMRA gives federal
from unfair labor practices.59
courts jurisdiction over disputes arising out of collective bargaining agreements." In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,6 1 the Supreme Court
held that LMRA section 30162 was a substantive provision which gave federal courts the power to create common law in the field of collective bargaining agreements. 63 The Court construed section 301 as manifesting a
congressional policy favoring federal enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements." This set the stage for an expansion of federal removal juris-

56. See Comment, FederalPreemption, Removal Jurisdiction,and the Well-Pleaded ComplaintRule, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 634, 646 (1984)(preemption removal problem of recent origin
because of proliferation of federal regulation).
57. See Fay, 98 F. Supp. at 280 (removal of state court action based on federal preemption). Fay was the first case allowing preemption removal. Since 1951, preemption removal
questions have become common in federal courts. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, _ U.S.., __, 107 S. Ct. 1542, 1545, 95 L. Ed. 2d 55, 61 (1987)(plaintiff's state law
claims removed to federal court on ERISA preemption basis); Franchise Tax. Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 7 (1983)(case removed to federal court remanded
because ERISA preemption defense not on face of well-pleaded complaint); Johnson v. England, 356 F.2d 44, 46-47 (9th Cir. 1966)(case filed in state court removable under section 301
LMRA).
58. See Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, 98 F. Supp. 278, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)(involved section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act).
59. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 140-188 (1982); see also Hoffman v. Beer Drivers & Salesmen Local
No. 888, 536 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1976)(Congressional purpose of LMRA to protect
employees, employers, and general public from dislocations of commerce caused by unfair
labor practices). The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, also known as the TaftHartley Act, was an amendment to the National Labor Relation Act of 1937 (NLRA). See 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). The LMRA was passed due to widespread criticism by business of
President Roosevelt's New Deal policies and the NLRA in particular. Employers criticized
the NLRA as a tool of organized labor. The LMRA extended the NLRA to unfair labor
practices by unions. See Gregory, The Labor Preemption Doctrine: Hamiltonian Renaissance
or Last Hurrah?,27 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 507, 509 n. 9 (1986).
60. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
61. 353 U.S. 449 (1957).
62. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
63. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456 (Congress intended section 301 to create substantive body of federal common law).
64. See id. at 455 (congressional purpose of section 301 to provide legal remedies). In a
spirited dissent, Justice Frankfurter accused the majority of attributing an "occult content" to
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diction under LMRA section 301.65
Section 301 became the vehicle for allowing preemption removal. In Fay
v. America Cystoscope Makers, Inc.,66 the district court avoided the effect of
Gully in a case where the plaintiff pleaded only a state law cause of action.
The court wrote that it can look beyond the face of the complaint in order to
determine the status of the parties if federal jurisdiction hinges on that status. 6 7 The plaintiff's status as a union representing employees placed its
complaint squarely within LMRA section 301 .68 Further, the court held
that since LMRA section 301 authorized the creation of a new, substantive
federal right, it preempted the field. 69
The reasoning in Fay was repeated in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735. 70
In a fact situation similar to Fay,7 1 the United States Supreme Court held
that the district court had federal question jurisdiction in Avco. 72 The plaintiff in Fay was a union charging unfair labor practices, 7 3 whereas, in Avco,
the plaintiff was a business bringing suit against a union alleging unfair labor
practices.7 4 The Court held that since the dispute arose under LMRA section 301, it was controlled by federal law.75 In Avco, Justice Douglas stated

section 301. Id. at 461. Frankfurter argued that section 301 was plainly procedural, yet the
Court, by relying on a few well chosen excerpts from the Act's legislative history, transmitted
it into a mandate to create a body of federal common law. See id.
65. See Comment, Intentionsof FederalRemoval Jurisdiction in Labor Cases: The Pleading Nexus, 1981 DUKE L.J. 743, 744 (federal jurisdiction steadily expanded since Lincoln
Mills).
66. 98 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
67. Id. at 280. The Fay court stated:
The normal rule in removal proceedings prohibits the court from looking outside the
complaint to determine whether or not a suit arises under federal law. [citation omitted].
However, where federal jurisdiction hinges on the parties, or one of them, having a particular status, the court may ascertain the existence of that status independent of the
complaint.
Id.
68. See id. (jurisdiction depends upon plaintiff's status as union representing employees
to bring case within section 301).
69. See id. at 281. "However, in the light of the determination that the section creates a
it seems clear that congress preempted the field in this
new, federal, substantive right, ...
area." Id.
70. 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
71. Compare id. at 339 (corporation filed suit in state court to enjoin union from striking;
union removed on basis of federal labor law preemption) with Fay v. American Cystoscope
Makers, 98 F. Supp. 278, 279-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)(union filed suit in state court; corporation
removed on basis of federal preemption).
72. 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
73. See Fay, 98 F. Supp. at 279-80 (corporation seeking removal).
74. See Avco Corp., 376 F.2d at 339 (union seeking removal).
75. See Avco Corp., 390 U.S. at 560.
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only that arising-under jurisdiction, 76 and therefore removal jurisdiction,
was "clear." The Supreme Court tacitly approved preemption removal
77
without supplying any analysis to support its reasoning in Avco.
After Avco, defendants attempted preemption removal in fields other than
labor law, 78 but since there were no definite guidelines for evaluating these
claims, the courts split in their treatment of the problem. 79 Generally, three
lines of reasoning developed with respect to the well-pleaded complaint rule
and preemption removal.
1. Rejection of Preemption Removal
Some courts refused to make exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint
rule to allow removal based on preemption.80 The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit rejected the Avco approach. 8' The court stated that federal
courts should not engraft exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule
without a legislative mandate.8 2 This line of reasoning advanced the notion
that courts cannot look beyond the face of the complaint until Congress
changes the removal statute.8 3 Other courts rejected Avco as an isolated
exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule limited solely to LMRA section
301.84

76. Id. The Court provides no analysis or discussion of original jurisdiction whatsoever.
The most the court says is that original jurisdiction was "clear." Id.
77. See id.
78. See, e.g., Trent Realty Assocs. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 657 F.2d 29, 35 (3d
Cir. 1981)(no basis for preemption removal within homeowners loan context); North Am.
Philips Corp. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 579 F.2d 229, 231 (2d Cir. 1978)(federal regulation
of interstate air carriers occupies field, therefore, preemption removal approved); La Chemise
Lacoste v. Alligator Co., 506 F.2d 339, 342 (3d Cir. 1974)(preemption removal rejected in
trademark field).
79. Compare Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n.2 (1981)(court
will not permit artful pleading to block defendants right to federal forum) with Motores, S.A.
v. Eagle Nat'l Bank, 632 F. Supp. 645, 647 (S.D. Fla. 1986)(court cannot look to removal
petition to establish federal jurisdiction) and Central Metal Products v. International Union,
Etc., 195 F. Supp. 70, 71-72 (E.D. Ark. 1961)(removal based on preemption by LMRA section
301 allowed).
80. See Washington v. Am. League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 460 F.2d 654, 658-60
(9th Cir. 1972)(federal preemption is defense, not ground for removal); Ely v. Allied Prods.
Corp., 562 F. Supp. 528, 530-31 (N.D. Ind. 1983)(removal not allowed even though dispute
might ultimately revolve around federal issues).
81. See La Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Co., 506 F.2d 339, 345 (3d Cir. 1974)(preemption removal rejected because preemption is defense).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Aberdeen v. Aberdeen Nat'l Bank, 627 F.2d 843, 853
(8th Cir. 1980)(court acknowledged preemption removal under LMRA section 301, but rejects
it within banking context); Johnson v. England, 356 F.2d 44, 47-48 (9th Cir. 1966)(removal of
state claim proper because section 301 preempts field); Central Metal Products v. International
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The "Artful Pleading" Doctrine

Other courts did not permit plaintiffs to frustrate the intent of Congress by
artfully pleading their complaint.85 These courts followed the Skelly Oil
principle of seeking to determine the true nature of the complaint, despite
plaintiff's characterization, 8 6 by focusing on the plaintiff's motive.8" The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Villareal v. Brown Express, Inc.8 8 stated
that a " ... party may not fraudulently evade removal by drafting a complaint so that the true purpose of the lawsuit is artfully disguised." 89 Under
the artful pleading doctrine, the courts determine that the plaintiff is actually
relying on federal law but invoking only state law in order to avoid federal
court. 9 Artful pleading has become an important theme in analyzing preemption removal cases.91

Union, Etc., 195 F. Supp. 70, 71-72 (E.D. Ark. 1961)(removal based on preemption by LMRA
section 301 allowed). See generally Comment, Intimation of FederalRemoval Jurisdictionin
Labor Cases: The PleadingNexus, 1981 DUKE L.J. 743, 745-46 (generally no problem removing labor case from state court if section 301 cited).
85. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n.2 (1981)(plaintiff may
not employ artful pleading in effort to deny defendant right to federal forum); see also Eitman
v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., 730 F.2d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 1984)(plaintiff may not defeat removal
by artful pleading); Hearst Corp. v. Shopping Center Network, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 551, 556
(S.D.N.Y. 1969)(plaintiff may not by artful manipulation defeat congressional intent). See
generally Note, Sullivan v. FirstAffiliated Securities: When Will The Artful PleadingDoctrine
Support Removal of a State Claim to Federal Court?, 18 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 177
(1988)(discussing of status of artful pleading doctrine in Ninth Circuit).
86. See Moitie, 452 U.S. at 397 n.2. Determination of the true or underlying nature of a
complaint was first allowed in Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
87. See, e.g., Eitman v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., 730 F.2d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 1984)(plaintiff may not defeat removal by fraudulent means); Jones v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 541
F.2d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 1976)(plaintiff may defeat removal unless fraud involved); Angela
Cummings, Inc. v. Purolator Courier Corp., 670 F. Supp. 92, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)(suit may be
removed where plaintiff fraudulently conceals federal question); See generally 14A C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3722 (2d ed.
1984)(overview of removal jurisdiction and artful pleading doctrine).
88. 529 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1976).
89. Id. at 1221.
90. See Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746 F.2d 635, 641-42 (9th Cir. 1984)(plaintiff disguised federal claim as state claim in order to avoid resjudicata),cert. denied, 474 U.S. 863
(1985).
91. Cf Buchanan v. Delaware Valley News, 571 F. Supp. 868, 871 (E.D. Pa. 1983)(exception to well-pleaded complaint rule arises when plaintiff conceals federal nature of claim);
Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 731 F.2d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1984)(application of
artful pleading doctrine in antitrust context); New York v. Local 115 Joint Bd. Nursing Home
& Hosp. Employees Div., 412 F. Supp. 720, 722 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)(artful pleading doctrine
caveat to well-pleaded complaint rule).
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3. The Superseding Cause of Action
The third line of reasoning recognized but limited preemption removal to
situations in which federal law provided for both preemption and a civil
remedy.9 2 Once Congress preempts a field of law and provides a remedy, the
federal cause of action supersedes any state law cause of action. 93 These
courts reasoned that if federal law fails to replace rights previously granted
by state law, it is illogical to maintain that the litigant's claim is based on a
federal law which gives him no rights. 94 These courts have required that a
plaintiff possess a right to recovery under federal law before preemption removal is allowed. 95 The reasoning of these cases can be traced to Justice
Holmes formulation of "arising under" in American Well Works v. Layne.96
In Layne, the Court stated: "A suit arises under the law that creates the
cause of action." 97 If a state law has been preempted by a federal law which
also provides a cause of action, then these courts would allow removal based
on preemption.9 8
Perhaps the lack of analysis in A vco was due to LMRA section 301 it-

92. See, e.g., Guinasso v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 656 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th
Cir. 1981)(removal appropriate when federal law displaces state law and confers federal remedy), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982); Long Island R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 484 F.
Supp. 1290, 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)(where federal law source of plaintiff's rights, courts look
beyond face of complaint); New York v. Local 1115 Joint Bd. Nursing Home & Hosp. Employees Div., 412 F. Supp. 720, 723 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)(removal proper when preempting federal
law provides federal claim). See generally Comment, FederalPreemption, Removal Jurisdiction, and the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule, 51 U. CHi. L. REV. 634, 654 (1984)(discussion of
preemption removal based on superseding cause of action).
93. See Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367, 1370 n.5 (9th Cir.
1984)(state law must be preempted and facts must state a federal cause of action to allow
preemption removal).
94. See Long Island R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 484 F. Supp. 1290, 1293 (S.D.N.Y.
1980)(illogical to state that cause of action based on law that provides plaintiff no rights).
95. See, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, - U.S. _ _ 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2430, 96 L. Ed.
2d 318, 326 (1987)(when federal law preempts state law and provides a remedy then it is said
to completely preempt state law for purposes of removal); Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746
F.2d 635, 642-43 (9th Cir. 1984)(removal based on preemption improper unless federal law
also provides remedy); Olgiun v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1476 (9th
Cir. 1984)(removal proper when federal law both preempts state law and replaced it with
federal cause of action).
96. 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
97. Id. at 260.
98. See, e.g., Olgiun v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1476 (9th Cir.
1984)(removal based on federal preemption allowed because plaintiff's exclusive remedy was
federal); Guinasso v. Pacific First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 656 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir.
1981)(preemption removal proper when federal law displaces state law and confers federal
remedy), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982).
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self.9 9 The language in section 301 and the legislative history of that section
are ambiguous at best."° In 1974, Congress, enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) which contained an explicit preemption
clause supported by a clear legislative history.'
ERISA's preemption
clause, section 514(a),1 °2 has been 3utilized by the Supreme Court to analyze
0
and clarify preemption removal.1

III. ERISA PREEMPTION
The enactment of ERISA in 1974 was the culmination of years of study
and debate over the regulation of private pension plans in the United

States." °

Congress, in order to achieve its goal of federal pension regula-

tion, included a sweeping preemption clause which displaced state laws relating to employee pension and benefit plans.'" 5 Federal preemption of state
law under ERISA has been, for the most part, straightforward.'o 6 However,

99. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1982).
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing
employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any
such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard
to the citizenship of the parties.

Id.
100. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460-62 (1957)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)(legislative history of section 301 "cloudy and confusing").
101. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (1982). The legislative history of ERISA may be found
in SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94TH
CONG. 2D SEss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 (Comm. Print 1976).
102. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982).
103. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, _ U.S. _,
107 S. Ct. 1542, 1544-45, 94
L. Ed. 2d 55, 58-9 (1987)(Court decided that ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) allows preemption
removal); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 7
(1983)(preemption removal not allowed in ERISA case due to well-pleaded complaint rule).
104. See Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361
(1980)(Congress enacted ERISA after a decade of study). Interestingly enough, Congress' first
attempt at regulating pensions came in LMRA section 3-2, which dealt only with pensions
established as a result of collective bargaining agreements.
See 29 U.S.C.
§ 186(c)(5)(A)(1982). Congress later enacted the Welfare Pension Plan Disclosure Act
(WPPDA) of 1958, which proved to be inadequate and was repealed. In 1962, President Kennedy created a task force to study the problem of pension plan abuse and corruption. The
efforts of this task force culminated in the enactment of ERISA by Congress and the President
in 1974. See 120 CONG. REC. 29, 934 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4838, 4843.
105. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)(1982).
106. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 108 (1983)(state human rights
law preempted as applied to ERISA benefit plans); Alessi v. Raybestos - Manhattan, Inc., 451
U.S. 504, 521 (198 l)(state law which prohibited reducing retiree's pension benefits by amount
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the question of preemption removal in ERISA cases plagued lower federal
courts. 10 7 In two preemption removal cases involving ERISA section 514,
the United States Supreme Court finally gave the preemption removal doctrine the analytical
underpinnings which lower courts need to guide their
08
decisions.
IV.

CLARIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF PREEMPTION REMOVAL

A. Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust
The first ERISA case in which preemption removal was directly addressed
by the Supreme Court was Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust.'09 In FranchiseTax Board, the defendant pension trust was
able to remove a state court claim for a taxpayer's attachment, and a declaratory judgment to federal district court based on ERISA preemption."'
Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous court, held the federal district
court lacked removal jurisdiction over both claims due to the well-pleaded
complaint rule."'
The Court in Franchise Tax Board finally supplemented the A vco decision
with the analysis which had been lacking for fifteen years." 2 The Court said
Avco stood for the proposition that a federal cause of action can be so encompassing that it entirely displaces any related state cause of action.
Therefore, any claim within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily arises under federal law.' '3
of workers' compensation benefits received before retirement preempted by ERISA). But see
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 758 (1985)(state mandated-benefit
law not preempted by ERISA).
107. Compare Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 798 (9th Cir. 1987)(plaintiff's
state court suit alleging only state-based causes of action removed on basis of ERISA preemption) with Powers v. South Cent. United Food & Commercial Workers Unions, 719 F.2d 760,
765 (5th Cir. 1983)(plaintiff's state suit claiming relief under Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act not removable on ERISA preemption basis).
108. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, - U.S. - _, 107 S. Ct. 1542, 1546-47, 95
L. Ed. 2d 55, 62-64 (1987); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463

U.S. 1, 22-25 (1983).
109. 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
110. Id. at 7. The Franchise Tax Board is the California agency created to enforce the
state's personal income tax law. Id at 5. The Construction Laborers Vacation Trust is a pension trust established by four associations of employers in the construction industry for the
purpose of funding yearly paid vacations for construction workers. Id. at 4. The underlying

issue in dispute between the parties was whether ERISA allows state tax authorities to collect
income taxes on funds held in trust under an ERISA regulated benefit plan. Id. at 3-4. The
Court never reached the merits of this issue. Id.
111. See id. at 28.
112. See id. at 24.

113. Id.
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The Franchise Tax Board Court, however, declined to allow removal
based on preemption. 114 The Supreme Court stated that a claim by a party
specifically listed in ERISA section 502(a), the civil remedies clause, might
be removable to federal court on the basis of preemption. 1 5 However, state
16
tax authorities are not given a cause of action under ERISA.1
The elements necessary for supporting preemption removal were enumerated in FranchiseTax Board 17 There must be a clear intent by Congress to
preempt a field. 1"' This intent can be found if Congress expressly preempts
state law and provides a federal remedy." 9 In this situation, the Court will
adopt the Skelly Oil analysis of the well-pleaded complaint rule and characterize a complaint containing only state law claims as one "necessarily arising under federal law. '"'2
B.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Taylor

In its 1987 decision of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Taylor, 2 '
the Supreme Court expanded preemption removal to include ERISA actions

114. Id. at 28. Also, the Court applied the Skelly Oil principle to state declaratory judgment actions. Id. at 18-19. The Court reasoned that if Skelly Oil did not apply to state declaratory judgment actions, the doctrine of Skelly Oil would become a dead letter because litigants
could avoid its limits by asking for a state declaratory judgment of federal law. Id.
115. Id. at 24. The Court states that claims arising under ERISA § 502(a) might be
treated analogously to LMRA § 301 claims as interpreted in Avco. That is, the Court is holding out the possibility that preemption removal may be extended from LMRA § 301 to ERISA
§ 502(a). Id.
116. Id. at 25-26.
117. Id. at 25 (federal preemption coupled with federal remedy).
118. Id. The Court stresses the fact that ERISA does not reach every question connected
to pension plans. As evidence for this proposition, the Court points to ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A)
which manifests congressional intent not to preempt state laws which regulate insurance,
banking, or securities. Id.
119. Id. at 26. The Court uses this factor, among others, to distinguish Franchise Tax
Board from Avco. However, it is clear that this lack of an express federal remedy is at the heart
of the Court's decision not to allow removal jurisdiction. See Twitchell, CharacterizingFederal Claims: Preemption, Removal, and the Arising-Under Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts,
54 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 812, 845 (1986)(according to Franchise Tax Board analysis, court
must find plaintiff has federal cause of action before recharacterizing claim).
120. FranchiseTax Bd, 463 U.S. at 24. It is ironic that the same type of recharacterization analysis first put forward in Skelly Oil is being used to expand federal court jurisdiction.
Justice Frankfurter, the author of Skelly Oil, was a foe of expansive federal jurisdiction and
engaged in recharacterization analysis in order to limit federal court jurisdiction. Skelly Oil
type analysis has now come full circle and is employed to enlarge federal court jurisdiction.
See Comment, Federal Preemption, Removal Jurisdiction, and the Well-Pleaded Complaint
Rule, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 634, 644 n. 40 (1984)(Frankfurter rejected Gully and looked to
underlying cause of action to avoid expansion of federal jurisdiction).
121. - U.S. , 107 S. Ct. 1542, 95 L. Ed. 2d 55 (1987).
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under section 502(a)(1)(B). 122 In Metropolitan Life, the plaintiff's state
complaint was removed to federal district court on the basis of ERISA preemption.12 The plaintiff claimed disability benefits under his former employer's ERISA covered employee benefit plan. 124 The Court held that the
plaintiff's state law causes of action had been completely preempted by ERISA section 514(a).12 5 In reaching this decision, the Court listed several
factors. First, the claim fell directly within section 502(a)(1)(B), ERISA's
civil remedy provision, unlike the claim in Franchise Tax Board.12 6 In addition, the unique preemptive force of ERISA was noted. 127 Finally, the
Court found clear evidence of congressional intent to preempt this field because the language of LMRA section 301(a) and ERISA section 502(f) is
parallel. 128 Further evidence of congressional intent that ERISA section
502(a)(l)(B) and LMRA section 301 claims should be treated similarly can
be found in the remarks of ERISA's legislative sponsors. 29
Franchise Tax Board and Metropolitan Life together show that the
Supreme Court has adopted the superseding cause of action justification for
preemption removal.130 Yet, a superseding cause of action is not really the
122. See id. at -, 107 S. Ct. at 1547, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 64.
123. Id. at _, 107 S. Ct. at 1545, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 61. The plaintiff, Arthur Taylor, had
been employed by General Motors from 1959-1980. In 1980, Taylor took a leave of absence
from work while involved in a divorce and child custody dispute. A General Motors psychiatrist determined that Taylor was fit to return to work. When Taylor refused to return to work,
his employment was terminated. Taylor filed suit in Michigan state court for breach of contract, wrongful termination, and wrongfully failing to promote him. Id.
124. See id. at -, 107 S. Ct. at 1545, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 61. General Motors, Taylor's
employer, has set up an ERISA covered employee benefit plan for its salaried employees. The
plan pays sickness and accident benefits to its employees and is carried by Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company. Taylor claimed benefits under the plan for emotional problems and for
back injuries he sustained in 1961. Id.
125. See id. at _ 107 S. Ct. at 1546, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 62. The Court held that common
law claims relating to employee benefit plans are preempted by ERISA. In support, the Court
cited a case which was handed down on the same day. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, U.S. _ -, 107 S. Ct. 1549, 1553, 95 L. Ed. 2d 39, 48 (1987)(civil enforcement provisions of
ERISA section 502(a) preempt state causes of action for claims within scope of section 502(a)).
126. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor,

-

U.S.

-

-,

107 S. Ct. 1542, 1547, 95 L.

Ed. 2d 55, 63 (plaintiff's claim falls within civil remedy provision of ERISA).
127. Id. at -, 107 S. Ct. at 1547, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 64 (ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) has
unique preemptive force).
128. Id. at _, 107 S. Ct. at 1547, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 64 (presumption that similar language
in two labor statutes has similar meanings).
129. Id. The Court quotes a Conference Report on ERISA § 502 (a) in part:
All such actions in federal or state courts are to be regarded as arising under the laws of
the United States in similar fashion to those brought under section 301 of the LaborManagement Relations Action of 1947.
H. R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, p. 327 (1974), quoted in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor,
__

U.S.

,

,

107 S. Ct. 1542, 1547, 95 L. Ed. 2d 55, 64 (1987).

130. Compare Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1,
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gravamen of Metropolitan Life; instead the superseding cause of action is
evidence of congressional intent to preempt the field."' The Metropolitan
Life Court implicitly rejected the artful pleading doctrine by failing to mention the plaintiff's motive for filing a state law claim."3 2 The plaintiff's motive was irrelevant because the decision hinged on the nature of the cause of
action asserted.' 3 3 The plaintiff in this case had no state cause of action 1to
34
rely on; it had been completely displaced by the federal cause of action.
Thus, the artfulness of the plaintiff's complaint in avoiding reference to federal law was moot.
The Court in Franchise Tax Board and Metropolitan Life provided the
substantive analysis to preemption removal which Avco had lacked., 35 In
such cases, the Court will look beyond the complaint, which purports to rely
only on state law causes of action, and determine whether the true nature of
the complaint is federal.' 36 If Congress has manifested an intent to preempt
an area of law, and has provided a federal remedy, then the complaint is

24-25 (1983)(state action coming within civil remedies provision section 502(a) of ERISA may
be removable) with Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, _ U.S. _ _ 107 S. Ct. 1542, 1547,
95 L. Ed. 2d 55, 64 (1987)(clear congressional intention to make ERISA § 502(a)(l)(B) suits
federal questions for purposes of federal jurisdiction). See generally Twitchell, Characterizing
Federal Claims: Preemption, Removal, and the Arising-Under Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 812, 845-47 (1986)(court must find plaintiff has federal cause
of action before allowing preemption removal).
131. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, - U.S. .,
107 S. Ct. 1542, 1548, 95 L.
Ed. 2d 55, 66 (1987)(suit which purports to rely on state law necessarily federal in character
due to clear intent of Congress).
132. Id. The Court does not mention the phrase "artful pleading," nor is there a reference to the plaintiff's motive in Metropolitan Life. It can be inferred from this omission that
the Court has abandoned the artful pleading doctrine in the preemption removal context. See
Comment, Federal Preemption, Removal Jurisdiction, and the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule,
51 U. CH. L. REv. 634, 660-62 (1984)(commentator notes a similar omission regarding artful
pleading in FranchiseTax Board). Similarly, the Court in Franchise Tax Board also refrained
from referring to the artful pleading doctrine. Id. One commentator has suggested that this
omission evidences a retreat from the Court's prior acceptance of the artful pleading doctrine.
Id.
133. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, _ U.S.._.., .. , 107 S. Ct. 1542, 1547, 95 L.
Ed. 2d 55, 64 (1987)(extraordinary preemptive power converts state common law complaint
into federal claim for purposes of well-pleaded complaint rule).
134. See id.
135. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1983). The FranchiseTax Board Court focused on the actual nature of the plaintiff's underlying cause of action. In formulating the Avco principle in Franchise Tax Board, the Court
focused exclusively on the cause of action. Id. at 23-4. The Court rejects the Gully language of
the complaint approach in some instances. Id.
136. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, - U.S. , , 107 S. Ct. 1542, 1548, 95 L.
Ed. 2d 55, 65 (1987)(court looks to intent of Congress to decide if complaint necessarily
federal).
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considered "necessarily federal."13' 7 The Supreme Court in Franchise Tax
Board and Metropolitan Life adopted the superseding cause of action justification for preemption removal, rejected the artful pleading doctrine, and approved the Skelly Oil approach to the well-pleaded complaint rule. The next
question is how far will the preemption removal doctrine be extended?
C. Application of Metropolitan Life
In a concurring opinion in Metropolitan Life, Justice Brennan noted that
this decision was restricted to statutes where Congress has clearly manifested an intent to allow preemption removal. 3 Justice O'Connor, who authored the majority opinion, also noted the Court's reluctance in extending
the preemption removal doctrine beyond LMRA section 301.139 However,
attempts have been made to apply the Metropolitan Life rationale to other
federal laws." 4 Arguments both for and against an expansive reading of
Metropolitan Life were articulated in Texas Employers Insurance Association
v. Jackson.141
In Jackson, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit extended the A vco
doctrine to the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(LHWCA).' 42 The court in Jackson noted that the case might raise the "evil
spectre" of the well pleaded complaint doctrine. 143 The court avoided this
obstacle by applying an expansive reading of Metropolitan Life to the
LHWCA.' 44 The Jackson court pointed to LHWCA's private remedy
clause as evidence of congressional intent to displace state law.14 5 The court
137. Id.
138. Id. at

-,

107 S. Ct. at 1548, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 65. (Brennan, J., concurring)(Court

holds removal jurisdiction exists only where Congress has manifested obvious intent to make
causes of action removable).
139. Id. at -, 107 S. Ct. at 1547, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 64 (Court reluctant to find extraordinary preemptive power such as LMRA § 301).

140. Compare Price v. PSA, Inc., 829 F.2d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 1987)(court held that Railway Labor Act (RLA) does not contain civil enforcement remedy on which to base preemption removal) with Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 820 F.2d 1406, 1420 (5th Cir.
1987)(court extends preemption removal doctrine to Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) based on presence of exclusive federal remedy).
141. 820 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1987).
142. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-948(a) (1982). In Jackson, appellant Leroy Jackson filed a state
court claim for bad faith insurance practice. Jackson, 820 F.2d at 1410. The insurance company sought a declaratory judgment and injunction against Jackson from prosecuting his state
court claim. Id.
143. See id. at 1418. Although not referring specifically to Skelly Oil, the court noted
that the well-pleaded complaint rule had "dropped a stitch or two" after being knitted into the

Declaratory Judgment Act. Id.
144. See id. at 1419. The Jackson court reads Metropolitan Life as focusing on congres-

sional intent. Id.
145. See id. at 1419 n. 15. The court noted that evidence of congressional intent was the
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also noted that the LHWCA is broader than the LMRA.' 4 6 On this basis,
the Fifth Circuit expanded preemption removal to the LHWCA. 4 7
Judge Jones, in her dissent in Jackson, narrowly interpreted Metropolitan
Life. 14 8 Judge Jones argued that A vco is a singular exception to the wellpleaded complaint rule.149 This dissent acknowledged that Metropolitan
Life extended preemption removal to ERISA 502(1)(1)(B).' 50 However,
Judge Jones read Metropolitan Life as requiring language identical to
LMRA 301 in order to extend the A vco doctrine to other federal statutes.151
The dissent maintained that the LHWCA lacked a civil enforcement clause
like the "Siamese twin" provisions of ERISA section 502(f) and LMRA
section 301.152 Also, the Ninth Circuit in Price v. PSA, Inc. 153 has refused

to extend the Avco doctrine to the Railway Labor Act (RLA).' 5 4 However,
the Price decision can be distinguished from Jackson on the basis that the
RLA contains no civil enforcement provision.' 55
The debate over preemption removal will now center around the proper
interpretation of Metropolitan Life.' 5 6 The majority in Jackson takes the
better approach. It is often difficult for a judge to determine what the true
character of an apparent state law claim is until the federal substantive law

provision of a federal private cause of action. Id. The majority alleged that the LHWCA
contained such a provision. Id. The court's analysis of Metropolitan Life is buttressed by
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, _ U.S. ., 106 S. Ct. 3229, 92 L. Ed. 2d 650
(1986). In Merrell Dow, the Supreme Court held that a state-based cause of action was improperly removed to federal court because the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) did not provide a private cause of action. See id. at - 106 S. Ct. at 3237, 92 L. Ed.
2d at 664.
146. See Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 820 F.2d at 1406, 1420 (5th Cir.
1987)(LHWCA remedy is broader than LMRA remedy). The majority points out that the
LHWCA was originally a product of the federal province of admiralty jurisdiction. Id. The
Jackson court maintains that LMRA § 301 is merely jurisdictional, while the LHWCA provides for comprehensive regulation of employers and insurance carriers. Id.

147. Id.
148. See id. at 1422 (Jones, J., dissenting).
149. See id. at 1423 (Avco rule unique exception to well-pleaded complaint rule).
150. See id. at 1423-24 n.1.
151. See id. The dissent reads Metropolitan Life as focusing solely on the similarities in
language between LMRA section 301 and ERISA section 502(f). Id. The dissent also stresses
the importance of the fact that ERISA's legislative sponsors directly referred to LMRA § 301.

Id.
152. See id.
153. 829 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1987).
154. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-185, 187-188 (1982). The Price court held that the Avco
doctrine did not extend to the RLA. See Price, 829 F.2d at 876.
155. Id.
156. See Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 820 F.2d 1406, 1419 (5th Cir. 1987);
Price v. PSA, Inc., 829 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1987).
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has been defined.15 7 Federal courts will be better equipped to delineate the
boundaries of arising-under jurisdiction if they are allowed to use a flexible
Metropolitan Life approach. 158 Preemption removal should be expanded in
order to avoid state court hostility or confusion about a preemption defense.159 As the majority in Jackson implies, the decisions in Franchise Tax
Board and Metropolitan Life lay out a two-prong test for applying the preemption removal doctrine." ° First, a federal law must completely occupy,
or preempt, a particular field of law.16 ' Secondly, a superseding federal
cause of action is evidence of congressional intent to allow preemption removal. 162 Preemption removal should
be extended to any federal statute
16 3
which can satisfy this two-part test.
V.

CONCLUSION

Federal removal jurisdiction has been restricted by the well-pleaded complaint rule for almost one hundred years. In the second half of the twentieth
century, the well-pleaded complaint rule came into conflict with growing
federal regulation. Plaintiffs avoided the effects of federal regulation by relying on the well-pleaded complaint rule to stay in state court. In some cases
however, Congress intended to completely preempt a particular field for federal regulation. In Avco, the Supreme Court initiated a new doctrine which
allowed removal on the basis of preemption. The Court, however, failed to
supply any analysis to support preemption removal. For the next fifteen
years, lower federal courts split over how and when to apply preemption
removal.
The passage of ERISA presented the Court with new opportunities to
clarify the preemption removal doctrine. In two ERISA cases, Franchise
Tax Board and Metropolitan Life, the Court finally decided the appropriate
157. See Allis - Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 207 (1985)(Wisconsin Supreme

Court holding that state tort claim not preempted by LMRA § 301 reversed).
158. See Twitchell, CharacterizingFederalClaims: Preemption Removal, and the ArisingUnderJurisdiction of the FederalCourts, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 812, 837 (1986)(preemption
analysis difficult to make until contours of federal substantive law known).
159. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BE-

TWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 93 (1969)(removal based on preemption defense

should be allowed to avoid state court hostility).
160. See Jackson, 820 F.2d at 1419-20. The Jackson court does not expressly call it a
two-prong test, however, the court focuses on the preemptive effect of the LHWCA and its
private remedy clause. Id.
161. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, - U.S.._, _, 107 S. Ct. 1542, 1547, 95 L.
Ed. 2d 55, 63 (1987)(ERISA section 502 has unique preemptive force).
162. See id. at -, 107 S. Ct. at 1547, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 63 (similar civil enforcement provisions manifest intent of Congress to allow preemption removal).
163. See Jackson, 820 F.2d at 1420 (LHWCA broader than LMRA and should come
within Avco doctrine).
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method for applying preemption removal. The Court adopted the Skelly Oil
interpretation of the well-pleaded complaint rule in its analysis of preemption removal. In preemption removal cases the Court will look beyond the
face of the well-pleaded complaint to the underlying cause of action. If the
underlying cause of action is necessarily federal, then removal will be allowed on the basis of federal preemption. In order to determine whether the
cause of action is necessarily federal, the Court developed a two-prong test.
First, the Court will ascertain whether a federal law has displaced state law
in a particular field. Second, a superseding federal cause of action is evidence of congressional intent to allow preemption removal. Thus, the Court
in Franchise Tax Board and Metropolitan Life laid the groundwork for extending preemption removal to other federal laws; federal jurisdiction on the
basis of preemption removal should be extended to federal laws which meet
the requirements of Franchise Tax Board and Metropolitan Life.
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